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Abstract
Do checking accounts help banks monitor borrowers?  If they do, the rationale both for allowing
regulated providers of liquidity to also make risky loans to commercial borrowers and for the government’s
providing deposit insurance becomes clearer.  Using a unique set of data that includes monthly and annual
information on small-business borrowers at an anonymous Canadian bank, we provide evidence that a bank
has exclusive access to a continuous stream of borrower data that helps it to monitor the borrower, namely,
the firm’s checking account balances at the bank.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first direct empirical test of the usefulness of checking account
information in monitoring commercial borrowers. We directly examine the mechanism through which a bank
is able to gain an information advantage over other types of lenders and find evidence that checking account
information is indeed relatively transparent for monitoring borrowers’ collateral and that such monitoring is
useful in detecting problems with loans.  As such, our data provide “smoking gun” evidence that banks are
special.Checking Accounts and Bank Monitoring
1.  Introduction
Do checking accounts help banks monitor borrowers? If they do, the rationale both for allowing
regulated providers of liquidity to also make risky loans to commercial borrowers and for the government’s
providing deposit insurance becomes clearer.
Some of the information in a checking account is clearly of use to a lender.  For example, a
borrower’s canceled checks and banking statements allow a lender to verify the usual information
accompanying a loan application; these are particularly useful in the absence of an independent auditor’s
report.  However, a bank does not have a monopoly over this kind of evidence—the borrower can provide it
to any lender.
On the other hand, a bank can have exclusive access to a continuous stream of borrower data on the
most timely basis possible, provided the borrower uses the bank as its exclusive depository.  This timely
access is useful in monitoring an existing loan to detect and control moral hazard problems associated with a
rising probability of bankruptcy.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first direct empirical test of the usefulness of checking account
information in monitoring commercial borrowers.  We analyze a unique set of data that includes monthly and
annual information on small-business borrowers at a Canadian bank that wishes to remain anonymous. 
Previous empirical research has documented the value of lending relationships to firms by examining loan
rates (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; and Berlin and Mester, 1998).  Other studies
have documented a positive abnormal stock-price reaction to announcements of new or continuing bank loan
agreements or loan commitments (e.g., Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel, 1995;
and Preece and Mullineaux, 1996).  Berlin and Mester (forthcoming) present empirical evidence for an
explicit link between banks’ liability structure and their distinctive lending behavior.  Yet none of these
previous papers directly examines the mechanism through which a bank is able to gain an information2
advantage over other types of lenders.  And this is the focus of our paper.
Black (1975) and Fama (1985) have argued that the “specialness” of banks rests on the notion that
checking account information permits banks to monitor their loan customers.  Nakamura (1993a,b) further
argued that, for the United States, circumstantial evidence suggests that such information is particularly
useful in lending to small borrowers, as their checking account information is relatively more transparent and
complete.  In this paper, we explore detailed micro data that show checking account information is indeed
relatively transparent for monitoring borrowers’ collateral and that such monitoring is useful in detecting
problems with loans.  As such, our data provide “smoking gun” evidence that banks are special.
2.  The Data Set
The data contain information on 100 small-business borrowers who are customers of the Canadian
bank.  A small business is defined as one with authorized credit between C$500,000 and C$10,000,000 and
whose shareholders are managers of the firm.  The average loan size in our sample is about C$1,500,000. 
The selected firms have been active for at least three years; public utilities, management firms, and financial
companies are excluded.  Fifty of these loans were declared troubled by the bank and the rest were healthy
loans over the period studied.  Most troubled loans were declared so between 1990 and 1992 (only three
loans were classified as troubled before 1990); healthy loans were last reviewed by the bank at some date in
1991 or 1992.  Each troubled loan was matched to a healthy loan in terms of the industry in which it operates
and the amount of its annual sales.  Six industrial sectors are represented in the data (see Table 1).
For each loan, we have both annual and monthly data.  For a troubled loan, the annual data pertain to
the firm’s three fiscal years prior to the loan’s being declared troubled, and the monthly data pertain to the
three calendar years prior to the firm’s being declared troubled.  For the matched healthy loan, we have
comparable information, with the reference date being the last time the firm’s credit file was reviewed by the
bank.  For example, consider a firm whose loan was declared troubled in April 1991 and whose fiscal year
runs from October to September.  Our annual data on this firm would cover the firm’s fiscal years FY1988,10/1/87 10/1/88 10/1/89 10/1/90
FY88 FY89 FY90




    Troubled
3
Because the reference dates for a matched troubled loan and healthy loan differ, the data on two
1
matched loans could potentially cover substantially different time periods, with significantly different
macroeconomic conditions.  But this does not seem to pose a large problem here, since the difference in
reference dates was under two years in all but four cases, and the maximum difference was three and a half
years for one loan pair.
FY1989, and FY1990, and the monthly data would run from January 1988 through December 1990.
1
The first three columns in the top panel of Table 2A show the average loan sizes for all the loans and
for the healthy and troubled loan subsamples over the entire three-year period covered by the data and over
each year individually.  The annual data contain information typically found on a firm’s financial statement,
e.g., balance-sheet data, such as the book value of accounts receivable and inventories; income-statement
data; some items from the statement of changes in financial position; and information in the firm’s credit file. 
One of these variables, the business sales of the firm, is reported in Table 2B.  We also have some
information from the outside auditor’s report on the firm, e.g., whether there were any qualifications in the
auditor’s report and the date of the audit.  These data would be available to any lender the firm approached
for a loan.  
The credit file contains information about the firm’s sales, the level of authorized credit the firm has4
gotten from the bank for an operating loan, additional credit for seasonal loans, and other temporary loans.  In
addition, there is information on whether the loan has covenants.  A crucial datum in each annual credit
review is the credit rating assigned to the loan by the bank’s credit department upon completion of the review. 
This credit rating is arranged on a scale of one through eight, with one being the best, and six through eight
being different degrees of “trouble.”  Table 3 shows the evolution of the borrowers’ credit ratings over time. 
At the dates when the loans were matched (i.e., at  t!3), there are 19 loans rated superior or standard in the
group of loans that do not become classified as troubled loans, while 31 have substandard credit ratings. At
the final rating period (t!1), there are 23 loans rated superior or standard.  By contrast, although 18 of the
troubled loans are rated superior or standard in the initial period, only one is so rated two reviews later. These
credit ratings are effective on the date when the credit department signs off on the credit review.  This sign-off
date is typically later than the planned credit review date, as the loan officer doing the review may ask the
borrower for additional information.  In addition, the interval between planned credit reviews is not always
one year, but may be shorter or longer.
Table 4 shows the outcomes for the troubled loans.  For the vast majority (72 percent) of these loans,
the borrowing firms ended up going into bankruptcy or were privately liquidated.  Of the other loans, nine
remained troubled, four were repaid, and one was upgraded.
The monthly data contain information on the value that the bank assigns to the firm’s accounts
receivable and inventories.  These are important ingredients in determining how much the bank is willing to
lend to a commercial borrower.  To restrict the use of the operating loan to purely operational ends and to
ensure that the borrower has adequate collateral for the loan, the bank verifies on a monthly basis that the
estimated value of the firm’s operating assets exceeds the amount borrowed.  The data also include the end-
of-month balance in the firm’s bank account, as well as the minimum, maximum, and average balance over
the month.
An important variable included in our data set is whether the firm has an exclusive banking5
arrangement with the bank.  This variable allows us to segment the loans into “exclusive” and “nonexclusive”
categories, providing a metric against which we can measure certain effects.  If a borrower has a nonexclusive
relationship with our bank, it is not clear whose customer the borrower really is.  In some cases, the borrower
will have a primary customer relationship with the bank we are studying, in which case the borrower’s
operating balance is likely to remain quite informative.  In other cases, the borrower’s primary relationship
will be with another bank, and the bank we are studying is dependent on the other bank for information on the
borrower’s creditworthiness.  Thus, if checking account information is valuable, we would expect it to be
more valuable for exclusive loans, since the bank’s account balance data on the firm would reflect its entire
checking account activity.
In our data, of the 50 troubled loans, 33 of the borrowers have an exclusive relationship with the
bank; of the 50 healthy loans, 26 have an exclusive relationship.  And there appears to be a definite
correlation between the completeness of our data and whether the bank serves as the firm’s exclusive bank. 
Of the 59 firms with exclusive relationships, we have complete data on 19, i.e., 32 percent, while of the 41
firms with nonexclusive relationships, we have complete data on only four, i.e., less than 10 percent.  The
bottom panels of Tables 2A and 2B show the average loan amounts and average annual business sales,
respectively, over time for exclusive and nonexclusive loans, and for these categories separated into healthy
and troubled loan subcategories.  As might be expected, firms that are larger, as measured by sales, tend to
deal with more than one bank and so do not have an exclusive relationship with the bank under study.
3.  Information Available from the Loan Operating Balance
A bank loan officer has access to fine-grained information about a borrower’s activities through its
operating account, as he or she can observe checks on an item-by-item basis and compare them to the
borrower’s pro forma business plan.  The continuing operation of a business demands that the business be
able to meet its financial requirements, which means that the business must have enough cash to pay its
employees, suppliers, and others.  The cash flows of the business are recorded in its bank account.  The bank6
account information is likely to be one of the timeliest sources of information available to the bank and will
not be as readily available to other lenders.  Can we empirically observe the value of this information?  We
approach this question on two levels.  First, we try to determine what information is contained in the
operating account balance; that is, we ask to what extent the operating account reflects particular types of
assets or liabilities of the borrower, such as accounts receivable and inventories.  Second, we try to determine
the extent to which the operating account supplies information that enhances the ability of the lender to
estimate the likelihood of a loan’s becoming a problem.  
Before continuing, it may be worthwhile mentioning that in the Canadian bank being studied, an
operating loan is supplied as a negative-balance checking account.  In the U.S., by contrast, the operating loan
and the checking account are separated, with the checking account balance, at least in principle, required to be
positive.  Thus, the operating loan balance plus the checking account balance in the U.S. would be equal to
the operating loan balance in this Canadian bank.  The U.S. system provides somewhat more information
than this Canadian bank’s system, and it is possible that drawdowns of the operating loan may represent
signals the bank can interpret.  Thus, if anything, the results found using our Canadian data should indicate
the lower bound on the information available in U.S.-style banking systems.
One of the chief functions of operating loans is the financing of inventories and accounts receivable. 
These items serve as collateral for the loan, and their values fluctuate with the business activity and prospects
of the borrower.  Thus, fluctuations in the value of accounts receivable and inventories should give the bank
information on the future performance of the loan.  To the extent that changes in the firm’s bank account
reflect changes in accounts receivable and inventories, they too should provide valuable information to the
bank.
And there is good reason to believe there is some relationship between bank account balances,
accounts receivable, and inventories.  A firm borrows money to make goods—the amount borrowed shows up
as a positive amount in its loan account.  Before the goods are sold, they show up in inventory.  Thus, there is7
a positive relationship between inventories and loan balance.  Once the goods in inventory are sold (but
before the firm is paid), inventories fall and accounts receivable rise.  Once the firm is paid—accounts
receivable are usually paid within 90 days—its accounts receivable fall and the firm deposits its money into
its checking account, so that its loan balance falls.  Thus, there is a positive relationship between accounts
receivable and loan balance.
Firm borrows 6 Firm makes goods 6 Firm sells inventories,    6 Firm is paid for goods
but receives payment
later
Loan account Inventories increase Inventories decrease Accounts receivable
increases Accounts receivable decrease
increase Loan account decreases
3.1  The correlation between the monthly data on collateral and the annual book-value data
The monthly data on accounts receivable and inventories in our data set are the bank’s valuation of
these items.  That is, they include subjective discounts (haircuts) from book value (note, we do not have
monthly information on these book values).  These haircuts provide a comfort level for the lender; they also
reflect the liquidity and quality of accounts receivable and inventories.  For example, as accounts receivable
remain uncollected, their quality may deteriorate, and the state to which the inventory is processed reflects its
liquidity—works-in-progress inventory is the least valuable, since it is the most difficult to convert to other
uses and, therefore, to sell to other producers.  In general, the bank would rather fund accounts receivable
than inventories; in other words, the bank would rather fund goods for which the firm has buyers than goods
that may sit in inventory for a long time.  
Table 5 shows the proportion of the haircut reflected in the bank valuations of accounts receivable
and inventories for end-of-fiscal-year data.  For these dates, we have both the book value of the accounts8
These regressions omit observations where the bank’s valuation is zero, as almost all of the zeros
2
were cases where the bank was not valuing the accounts receivable, as opposed to valuing them at zero.
receivable and inventories from the annual audits, as well as the bank’s valuations; the table shows the bank’s
valuations as a proportion of the audit value.  In general, accounts receivable are valued at two-thirds to three-
quarters of book value, while inventories are valued at between one-quarter and two-fifths of book value. 
Credit rating does not seem to have much effect on the size of haircut, although borrowers with a credit rating
in the “troubled” range may have their accounts receivable haircut more than those of  other borrowers.  This
presumably reflects the aging of some proportion of the accounts receivable.
For firms that deal exclusively with the bank, we would expect to find a higher positive correlation
between the book values and bank’s valuations than for firms without exclusive relationships with the bank,
since the bank might be relying on one of the firm’s other banks to monitor it.  In other words, the bank might
be free riding and setting its valuations less frequently than would be implied by changes in the book values
of accounts receivable and inventories.  Table 6A reports the regressions of the bank’s valuation of accounts
receivable on the (annual) book value for the entire sample and then by four categories: exclusive-healthy,
exclusive-troubled, nonexclusive-healthy, and nonexclusive-troubled.  As can be seen, we find a significantly
positive correlation between the book value of accounts receivable and the bank’s valuation for exclusive
firms: the adjusted R  is 0.83 for exclusive-healthy firms and 0.89 for exclusive-troubled firms, and the
2
coefficient on the book value is about 0.6 to 0.7 in both cases, close to the size of the average haircut.  The
coefficients are similar for the nonexclusive loans, but the R  is lower in the case of nonexclusive-healthy
 2
loans—largely because of one loan in that group.   It should be noted that very few observations are available
2
for nonexclusive loans.  The nonexclusive loans examined in the table are by and large those for which the
bank is the primary relationship, since for these loans, the bank has information on the firms’ accounts
receivable.
Table 6B reports similar data for inventories.   The coefficients on book value average around 0.2 to9
0.3, reflecting the substantial haircuts taken for these assets.  Here the only relatively close relationship, as
measured by R , is for the exclusive-troubled loans.  Once again, the tighter relationship found for exclusive
2
loans suggests there is much more useful information available for these loans than for nonexclusive loans.
Table 6C shows comparable information for bank balances and total operating loan balances shown
in the annual audit report.  Differences between the two are due to float and to cases where borrowers have an
operating loan balance with another bank.  We have omitted observations in which bank balances are
negative (where the borrower temporarily has a deposit with the bank rather than a loan), since these negative
loan balances are reflected not in negative operating loan balances in the audit report but as bank deposits. 
3.2  The relationship between loan balances and the bank’s valuation of collateral
The fact that we have the bank’s valuation of the accounts receivable and inventories rather than their
book values leads to different hypotheses about the relationship between changes in these items and changes
in account balances for our four loan categories: troubled and healthy loans to exclusive and nonexclusive
firms.  
For healthy loans to exclusive firms, the comovements of operating loan balances and valuation of
accounts receivable and inventories should be relatively transparent because the valuations for healthy firms
should be relatively stable.  A healthy firm should not have inventories piling up and should be receiving
payments from customers on a timely basis.  On the other hand, for troubled loans, the relationship between
valuations and loan balances will be more affected by control issues.  As inventories pile up and accounts
receivable age (as is typical in firms having troubled times), the bank may increase its haircut on the
collateral.  As the bank’s relative valuation of collateral falls, the firm’s credit limit (which is related to the
bank’s valuation of collateral) would also fall, and the limit might become binding.  This might disrupt any
relationship between the valuations and actual account balances, to the extent that the bank could not)End of Month Balancei,t/Annual Salesi ’ "0i % "1)Accounts Receivable Valuationi,t/Annual Salesi
% "2)InventoriesValuationi,t/Annual Salesi % ,i,t
10
If, however, the bank’s control of the firm were strong, we would expect a tight correlation between
3
accounts receivable, inventories, and balances, since a bank’s tightly controlling the firm would force credit
limits down as its valuations of collateral were reduced.
Consistent with this, we find that checking account balances were more volatile for nonexclusive
4
firms than for exclusive firms, although the difference was not statistically significant.
perfectly control the firm.   Also, the correlation between accounts receivable, inventories, and balances could
3
be disrupted if, as an alternative to increasing the haircut as a loan deteriorates, the banks asks for other
guarantees to back the loan.
How close the relationship is between the firm’s checking account balance, accounts receivable, and
inventories will determine the usefulness of the borrower’s checking account information for monitoring the
borrower.  Note that if the firm has multiple banking relationships rather than an exclusive relationship with
the bank, it may use the proceeds of its sales to pay down another bank’s loan.   The connection between
4
checking account information and accounts receivable and inventories may be less tight for nonexclusive
firms.
Thus, for our first test, we estimate an equation relating checking account balances to the bank’s
valuations of the firm’s accounts receivable and inventories and determine whether the relationship is tighter
for firms that have an exclusive relationship with the bank than for firms that do not.  We also estimate the
equation for the exclusive and nonexclusive subsamples divided into their healthy and troubled loan
subgroups to control for any loan performance effect.  We estimate the following equation for the six groups:
exclusive, nonexclusive, exclusive-healthy, nonexclusive-healthy, exclusive-troubled, nonexclusive-healthy:
where i indexes the firm and t indexes time.
Note, we normalize by the firm’s annual sales to control for heteroscedasticity, and we allow for a firm-11
We use the earliest annual sales figure available for each firm.  For troubled loans, this is sales in the
5
fiscal year three years prior to the loans’ being declared troubled, and for healthy loans, this is sales in the
fiscal year three years prior to the last credit file review.
Not only would the bank have less data on nonexclusive firms, but the value of any information it
6
had might be lower, since the firm would be less under the bank’s control.
It also suggests that the bank’s control is not perfect.
7
specific fixed effect.   (These fixed effects are significant (at the 10% or better level) only for the exclusive,
5
exclusive-healthy, and exclusive-troubled subgroups.)
As shown in Table 7, we find that the relationship is tighter, i.e., there is a higher adjusted R  , for
2
firms with exclusive relationships than for those that do not deal exclusively with the bank, and this is true
even when we control for loan performance.  This suggests there is more information to be gleaned from the
account balances for firms that deal exclusively with the bank than for those that have other banking
relationships.   The difference in R  is driven by the valuation of inventories: for exclusive firms, this
6 2
valuation is significantly positively related to changes in checking account balances, while for nonexclusive
firms, it is insignificantly negatively related.
Comparing the R  of this relationship for troubled versus healthy loans, holding exclusivity constant,
2
we see that the relationship is tighter for the healthy loans.  This may reflect the fact that when loans become
troubled, the bank may lower its valuations and the loan limits may become binding on the firm.   This would
7
disrupt the normal relationship between checking account balances and bank valuations of accounts
receivable and inventories.
Roughly 20 percent of the monthly observations of the bank’s valuation of inventories appear to be
at an upper limit.  These are cases where there are more than two observations of the same valuation and that
valuation is greater than others for that borrower.  If we rerun our regressions for exclusive-troubled loans,
dropping loans for which there are multiple observations of the same positive valuation (whether or not the
observation is the maximum for the borrower), the adjusted R  for the remaining loans increases to 0.34 (up
212
from 0.22 when the full sample of exclusive-troubled loans is used).  This 0.34 is almost the same as the
adjusted R  for the regression using the subsample of exclusive-healthy loans.
2
These results suggest that changes in inventories and accounts receivable explain roughly one- third
of changes in the operating balance.  Thus, simply having a continuous record of the borrower’s operating
balance in an exclusive client relationship provides the lender with a substantial amount of information.  Of
course, the loan officer has access to even better information, as the loan officer can examine individual
checks and deposits.
4.  Using Monthly Valuations to Detect Loan Problems
The monthly data allow the lender to detect when the loan amount exceeds the bank’s valuation of
collateral, which should provide a clear signal about the health of the loan.  Another signal is whether the
borrower is consistently borrowing an amount close to or exceeding the credit line authorized at the beginning
of the credit year.   These two criteria differ sharply on what kinds of lenders can use them.  The first type of
signal is available only to bank lenders.  Monthly monitoring and valuation of accounts receivable and
inventories are likely to be very difficult for a nonbank lender who does not have access to the checking
account data we have documented as providing useful information.  On the other hand, presumably any lender
will know the extent to which the borrower is using or even exceeding the authorized credit line.  Thus, we are
specifically interested in what additional information is provided by the bank’s valuations of collateral.
4.1 The relationship between monthly checking account information and signs of firm trouble
Our next tests examine whether there is a relationship between the monthly checking account
information and these signs of firm trouble.  To the extent that there is a relationship, the monthly data would
be providing information to the bank regarding the health of the loan.  Our measures for signs of trouble are:
exceed, which is the difference between the firm’s collateral (as measured by the bank’s valuation of the
firm’s accounts receivable and inventories and other guarantees posted by the firm) and the amount the firm
has borrowed, as a percent of the firm’s authorized credit line; and utilization, which is the firm’s borrowing13
Months for which our data are incomplete do not count as negative or positive exceed and, therefore,
8
do not increase either violations or nonviolations.  To the extent that data are missing and to the extent that
the firm is just borrowing an amount equal to the bank’s valuation of its collateral, the sum of violations and
nonviolations will differ from 36.
The logit results are qualitatively the same and are available upon request from the authors.
9
as a percent of its authorized credit line.  Troubled firms are likely to have lower, and possibly negative,
values of exceed and higher values of utilization, since they are likely to have borrowed more, had the bank
lower its valuations of accounts receivable and inventory, and had the bank also lower the firm’s credit line.
Both exceed and utilization are computed from the monthly data on the firm, and thus, they are likely
to be better trouble signs for exclusive borrowers, since the bank has more accurate monthly data on these
borrowers.  As expected, we found a lower mean value of exceed and a higher mean value of utilization for
exclusive-troubled firms than for exclusive-healthy firms.
When exceed turns negative, the bank is at risk, in that the borrower’s ability to relatively quickly
pay off the loan has become stretched.  This is a warning signal to the loan officer and to the bank.  How
useful is this signal?  We define a variable, violations, which equals the number of months for which exceed
is negative over the three years prior to our reference date (either the date when a loan was declared troubled
or the date of a healthy loan’s last credit review).  We also define violations_i, i=1,2,3, which is the number
of months exceed is negative in the i  year before the reference date.  Similarly, we define nonviolations, and
 th
nonviolations_i, i=1,2,3, which is the number of months for which exceed is positive.
8
We are interested in two nested types of outcomes: downgrades of a loan’s credit rating and, among
these, downgrades to “troubled.”  The declaration that a borrower is troubled is tantamount to failure of the
loan; in almost all cases, the ultimate outcome is bankruptcy (see Table 4).
We ran OLS regressions and logit regressions of whether a loan was eventually declared troubled on
violations, nonviolations, and utilization.  The OLS results are shown in Table 8.   First note that the
9
coefficients have the expected signs: the coefficients on violations and utilization are significantly positive14
Since the results for downgrades at the final review date are virtually identical to the results for
10
declarations of “trouble,” we omit them here for brevity; they are available upon request from the authors.
and that on nonviolations is significantly negative.  Taking all loans, including those on which we have no
information on violations or nonviolations, we find that the additional information on violations and
nonviolations adds 13 percent to the ability to separate troubled loans from untroubled loans.  (The adjusted
R  increases from 0.11 to 0.24 when violations and nonviolations are included in the OLS regression
2
equation.)  Note that this information is useful for both exclusive clients and nonexclusive
clients—apparently, the nonexclusive clients about which the bank collects this type of information are
clients with whom the bank has a strong relationship.  On the other hand, the results are little changed if we
exclude those borrowers for which the bank lacks information about violations.  
How quickly is this information used?  Two pieces of evidence suggest that the information is used
relatively soon after it is available, as one would expect.  Most of the information that determines whether a
loan is declared troubled is in violations in the most recent fiscal year before a declaration of trouble, as
shown in Table 9.  Here we use our disaggregated measures of violations, violations_1, violations_2, and
violations_3, which give separate counts of the number of violations according to how far in advance they
took place before the loan was declared troubled (or before the final fiscal year for nontroubled borrowers). 
The first column of Table 9 shows the regression results for the sample of loans excluding those for which no
information is available on violations during the third year prior to declaration.  The third column excludes
loans where there is no information on violations in any of the three years.  In both cases, the bulk of the
information is derived from the latest year: there is little difference in the adjusted R  when only the number
2
of violations in the year prior to declaration is included in the regression compared to when violations in each
of the three years prior are included. 
Now consider downgrades of  loans at the second review date, that is, at least a year prior to when the
loan was declared troubled.   Here we would expect that the most important information would be violations
1015
that occurred in the second year prior to the declaration that the loan is troubled.  Table 10 shows that is
indeed the case.  Almost all the information provided by violations in explaining downgrades in the second
year is contained in violations that occurred in the year prior to the downgrade.  The adjusted R  increases
2
from 0.12 to 0.19 when the second-year violations are included.  Here the information content of the second-
year violations is somewhat lower when all other information is excluded, but the information remains
significant both econometrically and economically.
4.2 How the lender reacts to signs of trouble gleaned from checking account information
The final three tables discuss what the lender does over time as loans become increasingly troubled
or, conversely, improve.  First, we examine the timing of the credit reviews the bank performs—both the date
on which a credit review was completed, relative to the date the review was planned to be completed, and
changes in the frequency of planned reviews.  We also examine whether the bank asks the firm for other
guarantees to back a loan as its quality deteriorates over time.
We expect that for loans that remain healthy, the completion of the credit review should be closer to
the planned completion date than for loans that deteriorate in quality, since for healthy loans, the reviewer is
less likely to find troublesome information that takes longer to evaluate.  Similarly, we expect that as a loan’s
quality deteriorates, a bank would want to examine the loan more frequently.  At the beginning of our data
(year 3), nontroubled loans were chosen to be approximately as creditworthy as the troubled loans.  Over
time, the nontroubled loans, on average, improve in apparent quality, while the troubled loans, by definition,
deteriorate.  Table 11 shows that among nontroubled loans, delays in loan reviews decrease compared to
planned dates. This suggests that for loans that improve in quality, loan officers are able to sign off on them
closer to the review date, while for troubled loans, a delay remains.  For example, in the third year prior to our
reference date, 90 percent of healthy loans have a delayed review while in the first year prior, only 69 percent
do.  Moreover the length of delay is cut by three-fourths—from about 120 days to 38 days, on average.  In
contrast, for loans that remain troubled, there is little lessening in the number of delayed reviews or average16
The modal number of days between planned reviews is about 365, a year.  The 340- and 390- day
11
cutoffs were chosen to represent periods significantly less and significantly more than a year.
length of delay.
The lower part of Table 11 shows that over time, as the troubled loans worsen, the time planned
between credit reviews shortens on average, while for loans that improve in health, the time between reviews
increases.  For example, for troubled loans, on average, the time between planned reviews decreases by about
48 days over the three years, whereas for healthy loans, on average, planned reviews become less frequent by
about 18 days.  Similarly, the number of troubled loans with fewer than 340 days between planned reviews
increases from 10 to 19 over the three years, while the number of healthy loans with more than 390 days
between planned reviews increases from 5 to 14.
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Table 12 replicates Table 11, but rather than sort the loans by whether they eventually are declared
troubled or not, we sort them on the number of violations they eventually have—in particular, we divide the
loans into two groups, those with violations less than or equal to the median level of violations over the
sample of loans and those with violations greater than the median level.  (The median level is 2.5 violations.) 
This is information that the bank can discern from the firms’ checking accounts.  In general, we see results
similar to those shown in Table 11, albeit a bit weaker.  First, loans with greater numbers of violations do
have their credit reviews delayed relative to loans that have fewer violations: for example, in the third year
prior to our reference date, 90 percent of loans with fewer violations have a delayed review while in the first
year prior, only 69 percent do; the length of delay declines from 118 days, on average, to 48 days.  For loans
with a greater number of violations, there is little decline in the number of delayed reviews and a much
smaller decline in the average length of delay, compared to loans with fewer violations.  The bottom panel
shows that all loans have an increase in the frequency of their planned reviews over the three years, but loans
with a greater number of violations have a larger decline in the number of days between planned reviews than17
The right side of the bottom panel of Table 12 indicates there is little change over the three years in
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the number of high-violation loans whose planned reviews are significantly more than a year apart and there
is little change in those whose planned reviews are less than a year apart.  However, over the three years, the
number of low-violation loans whose reviews are significantly more than a year apart increases.  This
increase is about the same as the increase in the number of low-violation loans whose reviews are
significantly less than a year apart.
Similar results are obtained if instead of dividing the loans into two groups, we divide them into
13
three groups: violations = 0; 1 # violations # 10; and violations $ 10.
do loans with a lower number of violations (approximately 17 days vs. 10 days).
12,13
Overall, we see that borrowers whose borrowing needs exceed the bank’s valuations of accounts
receivable and inventories have their credit ratings downgraded at the next credit review.  We have also
shown that, together with downgrading of credit, scrutiny appears to become stronger, with the credit review
itself dragging on and the time between reviews sometimes becoming shorter.
Finally, Table 13, shows that the bank does sometimes react to signs that a loan is becoming troubled
by requiring the borrower to post other guarantees.  But this occurs for fewer than one-third of troubled loans,
suggesting that this is not the bank’s major line of defense.  As shown in the table, among firms whose loans
remained healthy, 28 percent were required to post other guarantees in at least one month during the third
year prior to our reference date, and this percentage remains relatively steady over time.  Similarly, for those
firms with healthy loans that have to post other guarantees, the average dollar amount of these guarantees
remains fairly steady at between C$600,000 and C$700,000 per month.  The median value of these
guarantees for healthy loans does fall over time, as does the average number of months for which the firm is
required to post these guarantees: from over 8 months in the first year of our data to under 6 months in the
year prior to the last credit review.
In contrast, among firms whose loans were declared troubled, the percentage of firms required to post
other guarantees increases over time, from 16 percent to 30 percent, and the average amount of other
guarantees required triples, from about C$400,000 to C$1,200,000 per month.  Rather than declining through18
Similar results hold for when the loans are classified by the number of violations they eventually
14
had, as in Table 12.
time, as was the case for healthy loans, the average length of time that a bank requires other guarantees for
troubled loans remains fairly steady, at 9 to 10 months per year.  Still, it does not appear that requiring other
guarantees is a major tool used by this bank in reaction to signs of trouble, since the bank is requiring such




Are banks special?  This paper has described the efforts of one Canadian bank to use information in
checking accounts to scrutinize the activities of small business borrowers.  It is clear from the evidence that
the bank does use instances where borrowings exceed its own valuation of a firm’s accounts receivable and
inventories as a signal of deterioration in credit.  Moreover, movements in checking account balances are
closely related to movements in its valuation of accounts receivable and inventories, suggesting strongly that
the checking account provides a relatively transparent window on these aspects of a firm’s activity.  We
believe that these results taken together provide strong detailed evidence that banks’ handling of the
transactions of businesses enables them to be special lenders to firms.19
Table 1. Distribution of Loans by Industry
% of sample† % of exclusive loans†† % of nonexclusive loans†††
(100 loans) (59 loans) (41 loans)
Manufacturing 42.0% 44.1% 39.0%
Wholesale Trade 20.0% 25.4% 12.2%
Services 20.0% 15.3% 26.8%
Retail Trade 10.0% 8.5% 12.2%
Construction 6.0% 5.1% 7.3%
Primary (Mining, 2.0% 1.7% 2.4%
Agriculture, Fishing,
Forestry)
†These percentages also represent the percentages for healthy loans and for troubled loans, since the pairs
were matched on industry category.
††Exclusive loans are loans made to firms that have an exclusive banking relationship with the bank. 
Column does not sum to 100% due to rounding.
†††Nonexclusive loans are loans made to firms that have relationships with other banks.  Column does not
sum to 100% due to rounding.20
Table 2A. Average Loan Size†
All Loans  Healthy Troubled
Loans Loans
All three years 1496.3 1269.9 1741.1
(2485.8) (2828.8) (2024.3)
Three years prior to 1250.8 1126.4 1400.8
reference date (2216.9) (2546.4) (1730.1)
Two years prior to 1500.9 1231.5 1783.7
reference date (2388.7) (2608.3) (2099.8)
One year prior to 1679.4 1426.2 1938.5
reference date (2745.7) (3229.3) (2113.2)
Exclusive Nonexclusive Exclusive, Nonexclusive, Exclusive, Nonexclusive,
Loans Loans Healthy Healthy Troubled Troubled
Loans Loans Loans Loans
All three years 1365.8 1745.3 883.4 1849.9 1802.5 1584.9
(1994.6) (3207.9) (1612.5) (3945.6) (2197.5) (1491.1)
Three years prior to 1088.5 1593.0 797.3 1705.7 1396.6 1412.2
reference date (1682.3) (3028.2) (1494.6) (3674.8) (1813.2) (1495.1)
Two years prior to 1364.9 1762.3 836.7 1843.7 1839.7 1646.6
reference date (2096.2) (2853.8) (1686.6) (3516.8) (2307.0) (1472.2)
One year prior to 1592.1 1832.9 1014.2 1953.8 2056.4 1642.8
reference date (2095.8) (3613.7) (1635.3) (4462.9) (2302.1) (1508.6)
†Average over months and firms of loan size in thousands of Canadian dollars and standard deviation of loan
size in parentheses.  For healthy loans, the reference date is the last time the firm’s credit file was reviewed by
the bank.  For troubled loans, the reference date is the date when the loan was declared troubled.21
Table 2B. Average Business Sales†
All Loans Healthy Troubled
Loans Loans
All three years 16,898.0 12,805.2 20,990.8
(36,811.3) (16,445.5) (49,327.0)
Three years prior to 15,885.3 10,846.5 20,924.0
reference date (38,614.2) (10,730.7) (53,075.3)
Two years prior to 18,112.0 14,028.5 22,195.4
reference date (42,480.3) (23,284.1) (55,087.6)
One year prior to 16,696.9 13,540.6 19,853.1
reference date (30,472.3) (16,838.4) (39,423.0)
Exclusive Nonexclusive Exclusive, Nonexclusive, Exclusive, Nonexclusive,
Loans Loans Healthy Healthy Troubled Troubled
Loans Loans Loans Loans
All three years 10,108.8 26,667.9 10,742.0 15,040.4 9,609.8 43,083.4
(9,379.2) (55,321.0) (10,363.2) (21,199.6) (8,657.9) (80,721.0)
Three years prior to 9,746.7 24,718.8 10,405.2 11,324.6 9,227.9 43,628.2
reference date (10,041.9) (58,012.0) (10,261.7) (11,227.0) (9,847.3) (85,719.7)
Two years prior to 9,934.8 29,879.1 10,855.6 17,465.9 9,209.3 47,403.6
reference date (9,423.1) (63,609.2) (10,762.8) (31,376.1) (8,156.5) (88,698.4)
One year prior to 10,644.8 25,406.0 10,965.2 16,330.6 10,392.3 38,218.2
reference date (10,094.0) (44,645.7) (9,621.5) (21,842.3) (10,456.4) (62,167.3)
†Average over firms of annual business sales in thousands of Canadian dollars and standard deviation of
business sales in parentheses.  For healthy loans, the reference date is the last time the firm’s credit file was
reviewed by the bank.  For troubled loans, the reference date is the date when the loan was declared troubled.22
Table 3. Number of Loans with a Given Credit Rating Over Time
Credit Ratings for Loans Not Declared Troubled within Sample
Time
Reservations
Superior Standard Mild Average Strong 
1 2 3 4 5
No. of Loans at t!3 4 15 23 0 8
No. of Loans at t!2 3 17 23 0 7
No. of Loans at t!1 4 19 18 0 9
Credit Ratings for Loans Declared Troubled at Time t
Reservations Troubled
Superior Standard Mild  Average Strong Standard Severe Very Severe
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. of Loans at t!3 3 15 28 0 4 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t!2 1 2 14 1 31 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t!1 0 1 2 1 6 29 5 623
Table 4. Outcomes of the Troubled Loans
Number of loans Percent of Loans
Bankruptcy of the firm 10 20%
Private liquidation of the firm 26 52%
Loan remained troubled 9 18%
Loan repaid 4 8%
Loan upgraded to healthy 1 2%24
Table 5. Haircuts for Bank’s Valuations of Accounts Receivable and Inventories Compared to
Book-Value Accounts Receivable and Inventories
Accounts Receivable Inventories
Credit No. of Mean Median No. of Mean Median
Rating Observations Observations
1 Best 7 0.68 0.68 2 0.60 0.60
2 8 30 0.72 0.76 22 0.36 0.29
3 | 50 0.72 0.76 41 0.38 0.40
4 | 2 0.46 0.46 1 0.18 0.18
5 | 38 0.71 0.73 31 0.40 0.35
6 | 17 0.61 0.66 17 0.36 0.31
7 9 2 0.74 0.74 2 0.29 0.29
8 Worst 2 0.76 0.76 2 0.26 0.2625
Table 6A. Regression Results of Bank’s Valuation of Accounts Receivable on Book Value of
Accounts Receivable  
All Loans Exclusive, Nonexclusive, Exclusive, Nonexclusive,
Healthy Healthy Troubled Troubled
Loans Loans Loans Loans
Intercept 266.8 131.0* 1679.3 152.4* 284.0
(247.6) (77.0) (1960.8) (81.7) (280.6)
Book Value of 0.724* 0.699* 0.755 0.617* 0.665*
Accounts Receivable (0.102) (0.049) (0.592) (0.032) (0.092)
Adjusted R 0.30 0.83 0.04 0.89 0.81
2
No. of Observations 115 42 15 45 13
Table 6B. Regression Results of Bank’s Valuation of Inventories on Book Value of Inventories
All Loans Exclusive, Nonexclusive, Exclusive, Nonexclusive,
Healthy Healthy Troubled Troubled
Loans Loans Loans Loans
Intercept 392.8* 257.1* 2012.0* 62.5 488.1*
(98.6) (122.1) (616.6) (54.8) (249.9)
Book Value of 0.205* 0.219* !0.307 0.275* 0.172
Inventories (0.036) (0.050) (0.312) (0.017) (0.107)
Adjusted R 0.21 0.31 !0.002 0.85 0.12
2
No. of Observations 115 42 15 45 13
Table 6C. Regression Results of Bank Account Balance on Bank Operating Loans
All Loans Exclusive, Nonexclusive, Exclusive, Nonexclusive,
Healthy Healthy Troubled Troubled
Loans Loans Loans Loans
Intercept !187.3 440.9* !2426.4* 174.2 410.0
(222.4) (207.7) (864.1) (149.6) (383.0)
Bank Operating Loan 1.08* 0.519* 2.49* 0.849* 0.555*
(0.085) (0.111) (0.28) (0.048) (0.183)
Adjusted R 0.60 0.34 0.85 0.88 0.43
2
No. of Observations 113 41 15 45 12
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.)End of Month Balancei,t/Annual Salesi ’ "0i % "1)Accounts Receivable Valuationi,t/Annual Salesi
% "2)InventoriesValuationi,t/Annual Salesi % ,i,t
26
Table 7. Regression Results of Monthly Bank Account Balances on Bank’s Valuation of
Accounts Receivable and Inventories†
where i indexes the firm and t indexes time.
Exclusive Nonexclusive Exclusive, Nonexclusive, Exclusive, Nonexclusive,
Loans Loans Healthy Healthy Troubled Troubled
Loans Loans Loans Loans
) Accounts Receivable 0.474* 0.501* 0.532* 0.670* 0.423* 0.414*
Valuation/Annual Sales (0.0270) (0.075) (0.036) (0.111) (0.040) (0.102)
) Inventories 0.223* 0.141* 0.614* 0.116* 0.079 0.479*
Valuation/Annual Sales (0.053) (0.049) (0.101) (0.057) (0.064) (0.157)
Can H : Firm Fixed Yes No No No Yes No 0
Effects = 0 be rejected at
10% level?
Adjusted R 0.26 0.11 0.35 0.14 0.22 0.18
2
Observations 1099 385 533 221 566 164
†Here, a positive bank account balance corresponds to a firm’s borrowings exceeding its deposits; a negative
bank account balance corresponds to a firm’s deposits exceeding its borrowings.   Thus, positive bank
account balances indicate the firm is borrowing, on net. 
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.27
Table 8. Regression Results of Troubled Loans on Signs of Trouble in All Three Years Prior:
Evidence that Warning Signs of Trouble Forecast “Troubled” Loans
All Loans Exclusive Nonexclusive All Loans Except Those
Clients Clients With No Information On
Violations or Nonviolations
Intercept 0.330* 0.366 0.397* 0.151 0.388* 0.278*
(0.134) (0.231) (0.160) (0.195) (0.174) (0.0684)
Violations 0.0158* 0.0137 0.0239 0.017* 0.0215* 0.0285*
(0.007) (0.0094) (0.0147) (0.0083) (0.00798) (0.0065)
Nonviolations !0.010* !0.0078 -0.0128* !0.0071 !0.00745
(0.0046) (0.0074) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0059)
Credit Utilization 0.236* 0.389* 0.164* 0.353*
(0.080) (0.143) (0.098) (0.123)
Exclusive Client Yes No No Yes Yes No
Dummy 
No. of Observations 86 56 30 78 81 81
Adjusted R 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.19
2
Adj. R  w/o 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.19
2
credit utilization




Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.28
Table 9. Regression Results of Troubled Loans on Signs of Trouble in Each of Three Prior Years:  
Evidence that Almost All the Useful Information Is in Recent Warning Signs of Trouble
All Loans Except Those All Loans Except Those 
With No Information On With No Information On 
Violations or Nonviolations Violations or Nonviolations
in 3rd Year
Intercept 0.0753 0.198* 0.0819
(0.0990) (0.0749) (0.0843)
Violations, 1 year prior to 0.0831* 0.0879* 0.0852*
declaration of “troubled” (0.0196) (0.0183) (0.0149)
Violations, 2 years prior to !0.0217 !0.0218 !0.0216
declaration of “troubled” (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0192)
Violations, 3 years prior to 0.0201 0.0199 0.0163
declaration of “troubled” (0.0215) (0.0218) (0.0197)
Credit Utilization 0.2273** 0.238*
(0.1257) (0.113)
No. of Observations 60 61 78
Adjusted R 0.34 0.32 0.39
2
Adj. R  for violations, 0.32 0.33 0.37
2
including 1 year prior only
Adj. R  w/o 0.10 0.11
2
violations
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.29
Table 10. Regression Results of Credit Downgrades in the 2nd Year Before Classification on Signs of
Trouble in Each of the Three Prior Years:
Evidence that Warning Signs of Trouble Are Used Immediately
All Loans Except Those All Loans Except Those 
With No Information On With No Information On
Violations or Nonviolations Violations or Nonviolations
in 3rd Year in 2nd Year
Intercept 0.1109* 0.2564*
(0.0751) (0.0665)
Violations, 1 year prior to 0.0375*
classification (0.0184)
Violations, 2 years prior 0.051* 0.0386*
to classification (0.021) (0.0167)
Violations, 3 years prior !0.0293
to classification (0.0219)
No. of Observations 61 75
Adjusted R 0.19 0.06
2
Adj. R  w/o violations 0.15
2
1 year prior to declaration
of “troubled”
Adj. R  w/o violations in 0.12
2
2nd year prior to
declaration of “troubled”
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
**Significantly different from zero at the 10% level.30
Table 11. Evidence of More Intensive Monitoring as Loans Deteriorate
Delayed Completion of Review
% of Delayed Reviews Delayed Delayed
Average Number of Days Median Number of Days 
3rd year 2nd year year 3rd year 2nd year year 3rd year 2nd year year
prior prior prior prior prior prior prior prior prior
Healthy 90% 84% 69% 119.6 89.0 37.8 118.0 99.0 24.0
Loans
Troubled 84% 85% 79% 123.2 121.6 115.0 111.0 117.0 92.0
Loans
Times Between Planned Reviews
Average Number of Days  Average Change in Number of Loans Whose
Between Planned Reviews Number of Days Days Between
Between Planned Planned Reviews Are:
Reviews
> 390 < 340 > 390 < 340
3rd year prior to 2nd year prior Between 3rd year prior 3rd year prior to 2nd year prior to
2nd year prior to year prior to 2nd year prior and 2nd year prior year prior
2nd year prior to year
prior
Healthy 365.0 383.3 Number of days 5 7 14 6
Loans between planned
reviews increases, on
average, by 18.37 days
Troubled 365.8 318.1 Number of days 10 10 9 19
Loans between planned
reviews decreases, on
average, by 47.96 days31
Table 12. Evidence of More Intensive Monitoring in Response to Violations Based on the
Monthly Bank Account Information†
Delayed Completion of Review
% of Delayed Reviews Delayed Delayed
Average Number of Days Median Number of Days 
3rd year 2nd year year 3rd year 2nd year year 3rd year 2nd year year
prior prior prior prior prior prior prior prior prior
Loans with # 90% 80% 69% 118.1 98.9 48.1 118.0 99.0 51.0
Median No.
of Violations
Loans with > 85% 90% 79% 124.7 111.5 104.5 111.0 105.0 83.0
Median No.
of Violations
Times Between Planned Reviews
Average Number of Days  Average Change in Number of Loans Whose
Between Planned Reviews Number of Days Days Between
Between Planned Planned Reviews Are:
Reviews
> 390 < 340 >390 < 340
3rd year prior to 2nd year prior Between 3rd year prior 3rd year prior to 2nd year prior to
2nd year prior to year prior to 2nd year prior and 2nd year prior year prior
2nd year prior to year
prior
Loans with # 367.1 354.6 Number of days 5 6 10 12
Median No. between planned
of Violations reviews decreases, on
average, by 9.94 days
Loans with > 363.6 347.7 Number of days 10 11 13 13
Median No. between planned
of Violations reviews decreases, on
average, by 16.98 days
†The median number of violations is 2.5.32
Table 13. Evidence on Whether the Bank Requires Other Guarantees as Loans Deteriorate
Other Guarantees Required by the Bank
% of Loans Average Dollar Amount of Median Dollar Amount Average Number of
Required to Post Other Guarantees for Loans of Other Guarantees Months Other
Other Guarantees† Requiring Other Guarantees‡ for Loans Requiring Guarantees Are
(As a percent of Other Guarantees Required
average loan size)
3rd 2nd year 3rd 2nd  year 3rd 2nd year 3rd 2nd year
year year prior  year year  prior year year prior year year prior
prior prior prior  prior prior prior prior prior
Healthy 28% 22% 26% 664.7 620.6 623.0 557.6 646.3 280.9 8.4 11.0 5.5
Loans (60.1%) (60.3%) (65.1%)
Troubled 16% 30% 30% 401.5 835.8 1213.3 281.5 397.1 403.0 9.9 10.0 8.7
Loans (32.2%) (52.0%) (34.2%)
†This is the percentage of firms in each category that were required to post other guarantees in at least one
month of the year.
‡Dollar amount in thousands of Canadian dollars.  The ratio in parentheses is the average value of other
guarantees in the year divided by the average loan size in the year.  We excluded one firm in the healthy loan
category because it was a depositor rather than a borrower over most of the period.33
References
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell, 1995. “Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm
Finance,” Journal of Business, 68, 351-81.
Berlin, Mitchell and Loretta J. Mester, 1998. “On the Profitability and Cost of Relationship Lending,”
Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 873-897.
Berlin, Mitchell and Loretta J. Mester, forthcoming. “Deposits and Relationship Lending,”  Review of
Financial Studies.
Billet, Matthew T., and Mark J. Flannery and Jon A. Garfinkel, 1995. “The Effect of Lender Identity on a
Borrowing Firm’s Equity Return,” Journal of Finance, 2, 699-718.
Black, Fischer, 1975. “Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market,” Journal of Financial Economics,
2, 323-339.
Fama, Eugene F. 1985. “What’s Different About Banks?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 15, 29-40.
Lummer, Scott L. and John J. McConnell, 1989. “Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the
Capital Market Response to Bank Loan Announcements,” Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 99-
122. 
Nakamura, Leonard I., 1993a. “Commercial Bank Information: Implications for the Structure of Banking,”
pp. 131-160 in Michael Klausner and Lawrence J. White, ed., Structural Change in Banking,
Business One/Irwin, Homewood, IL.
Nakamura, Leonard I., 1993b. “Recent Research in Commercial Banking: Information and Lending,”
Financial Markets, Institutions, and Instruments, 2, 73-88.
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from
Small Business Data,” Journal of Finance, 49, 3-37.
Preece, Diana and Donald J. Mullineaux, 1996. “Monitoring, Loan Renegotiability, and Firm Value: The
Role of Lending Syndicates,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 577-94.